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I. OVERVIEW
The current financial market volatility of Southeast Asia and the
corresponding anxiety it has fostered in other emerging markets, all
of which has followed so closely on the heels of the chill on invest-
* Christopher J. Mailander, Esq. is Managing Director of the Savile Group, a
consultancy based in Washington, D.C., focused on finance and international
trade. Mr. Mailander authored the initial piece in this dialogue on international
private equity investment, Searching for Liquidity: United States Exit Strategies
for International Private Equity Investment, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 71 (1997).
The author (mailander@earthlink.net) welcomes additional comments, questions,
and critiques regarding this emerging area of finance.
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ment which spread through Latin America following Mexico's peso
devaluation in 1994, is calling on financiers and policymakers to ex-
plore the full implications of a more global world. The increasing
interconnectedness of the world's markets raises a plethora of issues
that are still not fully understood. One particularly important issue in
this ongoing analysis turns on the means by which economies can re-
alize foreign investment's beneficial attributes, yet mitigate their sus-
ceptibility to attenuated adversity when such investment capital is
withdrawn. As expected, the solutions offered on how to "manage"
capital flows are widely divergent and controversial. How they are
ultimately addressed will have a significant impact on the shape of
capital markets and economic development in both developed and
emerging markets for the years to come.
In the most recent issue of the American University International
Law Review, I explored a number of issues associated with interna-
tional private equity investment,' one form of foreign investment that
arguably fits within the definition of what some commentators refer
to in a relatively pedestrian sense as "good" capital.2 In Searching
for Liquidity: United States Exit Strategies for International Private
Equity Investment, an analysis was set forth which reviewed the role
of international private equity investment as a component of ever-
increasing flows of capital, its promise to foreign companies and
other countries as a tool for development, and one approach to over-
coming the most significant challenge facing the international private
equity investor-realizing a viable exit.
Searching for Liquidity was accompanied by three critiques from
independent commentators with extensive experience in the interna-
tional private equity field. These commentators offered additional
comments, observations, and insights on this emerging form of fi-
nancing. The product of Searching for Liquidity and these three cri-
1. Christopher J. Mailander, Searching for Liquidity: United States Exit
Strategies for International Private Equity Investment, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 71
(1997) [hereinafter Searching for Liquidity].
2. See Michael Howell, A Question of Balance, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1997, at
105 (describing the influence of varying types of foreign capital flows on emerg-
ing markets). The author characterizes foreign direct investment as a form of
growth-creating capital, i.e. "good" capital for emerging markets. In contrast, he
describes portfolio investment as volatility-creating capital, i.e. "bad" capital for
emerging markets.
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tiques is a valuable compendium of issues to be considered by the
international private equity investor and the foreign company in need
of external financing. This response both addresses these critiques
and extends the analysis by reviewing the policy implications of the
various approaches that will again be offered for managing increas-
ing flows of foreign capital and, in particular, "bad" capital.3
II. CONTINUING THE DIALOGUE: EVALUATING
EXIT STRATEGIES FOR INTERNATIONAL
PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENT
Searching for Liquidity discusses both the broader attributes of
international private equity investment and one strategy for enhanc-
ing the likelihood of that investment's success. That strategy, exiting
through the United States public or private capital markets, impli-
cates a number of issues for both the private equity investor as well
as the host company. As such, the article reviews the disclosure re-
quirements of, and potential legal liability imposed by, United States
federal securities laws as well as various strategies for minimizing
these burdens. The article discusses the use of American Depository
Receipts ("ADRs") as the preferred vehicle for a United States of-
fering by a foreign company. Finally, the article reviews the role the
investor plays as an advisor to the company in helping it employ the
structures and strategies necessary to realize, as commentator Jerry
Feigen phrases it, the "timely distribution of portfolio investment
with maximum valuation potential,"4 or, in other words, the most
successful investment opportunity possible.
In their analyses, the three commentators approached Searching
for Liquidity from distinct perspectives. Before addressing the spe-
cific issues raised by these critiques, it is beneficial to explore the
range of financing purposes and structures that fall under the um-
brella known as "international private equity investment." A more
developed context for understanding international private equity in-
vestment will aid a discussion of the commentator's critiques and
their relationship to a United States exit strategy, particularly con-
3. See id
4. Jerry Feigen, Potential Exiting Through ADRs (and/or GDRs?) for Inter-
national Private Equity Investors, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 109 (1997).
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cerning emerging market companies or exits made outside the United
States.
A. THE CONTINUUM OF INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE EQUITY
INVESTMENT
The varying structures and purposes included within the field of
private equity finance, which includes both venture and non-venture
financing, unfortunately, do not fit within universally-defined catego-
ries.' Due to its comprehensiveness and attempt at clear delineations,
however, a useful model for purposes of this analysis is that set forth
by the Federal Reserve System Board of Governors.6 The Federal
Reserve's categorization of private equity investment generally refers
to a range of financing: (1) early-stage new ventures, including those
companies in need of seed capital to research and determine the fea-
sibility of a concept or start-up capital to begin operations; (2) later-
stage new ventures, including those companies seeking to expand
their operations; (3) middle-market private firms that have an estab-
lished track record, but cannot finance their efforts to expand their
operations or effectuate a change in ownership through traditional
bank lending; (4) firms in financial distress; (5) firms suitable for
buy-outs (i.e., LBOs, MBOs); and (6) public companies which may
already have access to public financing, but for reasons related to the
cost, lack of confidentiality, or complexity in raising capital in the
public market, choose to utilize private equity financing
As these categorizations relate to the commentators' critiques,
5. Compare GEORGE W. FENN ET AL., BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RESERVE, THE EcONOMICs OF THE PRIVATE EQUITY MARKET 1, 17-21 (1995)
(providing six categories of private equity financing, but recognizing these catego-
rizations may be overlapping or less than distinct), with Venture Capital in OECD
Countries, FIN. MKT. TRENDS, Feb. 1996, at 15 (1996), available in LEXIS, News
Library, Finmkt File [hereinafter Venture Capital] (providing five categories of
venture capital financing, including seed capital, start-up capital, expansion capi-
tal, mezzanine financing, and buy-out/buy-in capital), and INT'L FIN. CORP.,
INVESTMENT FUNDS IN EMERGING MARKETS 10 (1996) (discussing two categories
of venture capital financing: "early stage" financing, including seed, start-up, and
other early stage capital; and "expansion stage" financing which includes working
capital; expansion capital, or bridge/mezzanine financing).
6. See FENN ET AL., supra note 5, at 45-49 (discussing the categories of com-
panies in need of private equity financing and the purposes for such financing).
7. See id.
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much of their discussions focused specifically on companies in need
of start-up and early stage financing-typically referred to in the
United States as venture capital financing-and not those companies
in need of non-venture financing, but which fall within the broader
definition of private equity financing. For purposes of this response,
the distinction is an important one to highlight in order to fully un-
derstand the relevance and applicability of a United States exit strat-
egy. For example, in the international arena, private equity financing,
more often than not, refers to non-venture financing.8 Furthermore,
the most active investors in the private equity market are institutional
investors from developed countries, scouting opportunities in both
the venture and non-venture arena.' For these reasons, private equity
investment, as it is addressed in this response, includes the range of
purposes and structures identified by the Federal Reserve, albeit with
an international, rather than a domestic, dimension.
B. THE APPLICABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES EXIT STRATEGY
For a number of reasons, but largely due to the significant possi-
bility of receiving a higher valuation for shares offered, the United
States capital markets may be particularly attractive to a foreign is-
suer that received private equity investment during its formative
stages and now seeks to raise additional capital. Among the exiting
options available to a foreign company, however, an exit through the
8. See Venture Capital, supra note 5, T 8. In the United States and Canada,
venture capital financing is typically associated with firms in their start-up or early
stages of development. In contrast, venture capital in other OECD countries is
typically associated with later-stage investments, including funds dedicated to
management buy-outs and buy-ins. See Peter Lee, Barbarians at the Gate of
Europe, EUROMONEY, Nov. 1997, at 44 (describing various structures and ap-
proaches used in the European private equity market).
9. See Betsy McKay, Russian Firms Continue to Lure Foreign Money, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 9, 1997, at A19 (describing international private equity investment in
Russia); Danielle Robinson, Wall Street's Latin Obsession: Will It Last?,
INvESTMENT DEALERS' DIGEST, June 2, 1997, at 16, available in LEXIS, News
Library, IDD File (describing United States private equity activity in Latin Amer-
ica); Suzanne Miller, Private Equity Needs Patience, EUROMONEY, May 1997, at
21 (describing private equity activity in Eastern Europe); Risks and Chances,
EcONOMIsT, June 28, 1997, at 81 (describing venture capital developments in
Germany); Jonathan Karp, India Looks Abroad for Private Im'estors, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 19, 1997, at A12 (describing international private equity investment in In-
dia).
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United States public markets could be the most difficult to achieve.
The United States capital markets, therefore, are not a realistic option
for all companies. The commentators were quick to make this point.'"
Therefore, the more practical question, recognizing the early but en-
couraging state of development for international private equity fi-
nance, is what types of companies have a realistic opportunity to tap
the United States markets?
While there are no hard and fast rules, foreign companies with
certain characteristics do stand out. First, as institutional investors
have become comfortable with offerings from large foreign issuers
undergoing privatization, they are now scouting new foreign offer-
ings which will boost the returns of their portfolios in exchange for
the assumption of a higher level of risk. As a consequence, they are
turning to the next tier of foreign companies that have a lower level
of capitalization (medium-sized companies). As pointed out in
Searching for Liquidity, initial public offerings of foreign companies
ranging from about $20 million to $100 million were favorably re-
ceived in 1996.11 Given this interest in the lower tier companies,
many of those companies which fall within the categories of non-
venture private equity investing noted in the Federal Reserve catego-
rizations above, may be suitable candidates for a United States of-
fering rather than an offering in other capital markets. 2
Second, United States investors are more comfortable with tech-
nology-oriented companies than with their foreign counterparts gen-
erally, and, therefore, companies with sound prospects in telecom-
munications, computer hardware and software, biotechnology, etc.,
are more likely to make a strong showing in a United States offer-
ing.
13
Third, United States investors purchasing equity have proven to be
more receptive to foreign offerings from companies based in devel-
oped countries as opposed to those from emerging markets. 4 In light
10. As each of the commentators are significantly interested in the economic
development of emerging markets, their perspectives perhaps underlie this point.
11. See Searching for Liquidity, supra note 1, at 100-0 1.
12. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text (discussing the categories of
companies involved in private equity financing).
13. See Searching for Liquidity, supra note 1, at 102-03 (describing various
types of technology companies that have employed United States exit strategies).
14. See id at 103 n.217 (describing companies from developed countries that
384 [13:379
1997] TEMPEING A CHILL ON SKITTISH CAPITAL M4RKETS
of the recent currency crises in emerging markets, this preference for
interests in foreign companies from developed countries is likely to
continue for the foreseeable future. As another dimension to this pre-
dicament, to the extent that a foreign issuer seeks to conduct a public
offering in the United States, the company's ability to achieve a
transparent level of disclosure and compliance with international ac-
counting standards, on par with that required of companies in the
United States, will facilitate a United States offering. 5
The other important issue for the foreign issuer in considering
whether to approach the United States capital markets is the variabil-
ity of the offering structure. While the issue was not discussed by the
commentators, one of the primary points of Searching for Liquidity
was to address the numerous structures that a foreign company can
utilize to access the United States market, particularly under those
circumstances in which a company cannot meet the legal, account-
ing, and market conditions necessary to conduct a public offering. 6
These include, most notably, conducting a private placement, which
is entitled to a safe harbor from the federal securities laws under Rule
144A, or seeking a listing on NASDAQ's over-the-counter market.
Both options may prove beneficial to the foreign company's effort to
gain a foothold in the United States market, with the later anticipa-
tion of raising capital in the public market. 7 To date, companies
from emerging markets have utilized these approaches to the United
States market more consistently than they have utilized public offer-
ings.
18
C. OTHER EXIT STRATEGIES FOR THE INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE
EQUITY INVESTMENT
In Searching for Liquidity, it was noted that the range of exit
strategies available to a foreign company included not only taking
the company public, but also making the company available for ac-
employ United States exit strategies).
15. See id at 99-90. Obviously, companies which have been operating under
financial regimes in countries which approximate the United States threshold are
better prepared than companies from those emerging markets which have yet to
liberalize their domestic capital markets or adopt appropriate regulatory reforms.
16. See id. at 91, 99.
17. See id. at 104, 107.
18. See Searching for Liquidity, supra note 1, at 105-107.
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quisition by another, orchestrating a repurchase of the shares by the
company, or arranging a secondary purchase of the equities by a third
party.' In his critique, Robert D. Stillman provides a succinct and
valuable summary of these and other exit strategies.2 ° Mr. Stillman
correctly notes that while these exit strategies may not produce the
highest valuation possible for the foreign company, such strategies
are more likely routes to executing an exit from the international pri-
vate equity investment, particularly for companies based in emerging
markets.
2 1
D. CONSIDERING OTHER OFFERING VEHICLES AND OTHER
MARKETS
Mr. Feigen raises a number of the major issues associated with the
use of depository receipts (" DRs"), particularly those used in other
capital markets such as the Euromarket.22 While potentially useful to
the foreign issuer, depository receipts other than American Deposi-
tory Receipts ("ADRs") were not discussed in Searching for Li-
quidity since in most cases, due to market and legal considerations,
such instruments would not be the preferred vehicle for an exit in the
United States.23 Mr. Feigen suggests that Global Depository Receipts
19. Seeid. at78.
20. Robert D. Stillman, Alternate Exit Strategies for International Private Eq-
uity, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 133 (1997).
21. See id. Several comments about these alternative exit strategies outlined by
Mr. Stillman are worth noting. First, Mr. Stillman explains that the institutional
investor can realize a return on its foreign investment through securitization of a
project's cash flow stream. See id. at 135. Project finance has proved to be one of
the most successful means of foreign investment in emerging markets, and the de-
velopment of asset-backed securities ("ABSs") holds significant potential. First,
however, these structures are premised on an offering of debt rather than equity.
Secondly, in the case of ABSs, the investor purchases an interest in the receivables
of a company with a well-established cash flow rather than a new venture, firm in
financial distress, or firm targeted for a non-public buy-out. Third, regarding the
use of arrangements built into financing instruments at the initiation of an interna-
tional private equity investment, such an approach is obviously very attractive to
the investor as a means of lowering the risk assumed with the investment. The In-
ternational Finance Corporation notes, however, that it has encountered problems
of enforceability of put arrangements with several of its emerging market funds,
and, therefore, the practitioner should use due caution. See INT'L FIN. CORP., su-
pra note 5, at 29.
22. See Feigen, supra note 4, at 121.
23. First, ADRs are the commonly utilized vehicle in foreign offerings targeted
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(" GDRs") may become a preferred offering vehicle as a more global
capital market emerges. In time, this may prove true, but only as the
major capital markets achieve a level of uniformity by undertaking
"globalization," not only in a financial sense, but also legally. Until
that point, however, vehicles like ADRs, which are specifically
aimed at overcoming the regulatory barriers between separate and
distinct capital markets, will likely continue to be the preferred
means by which investors in the United States acquire interests in
foreign companies.
Perhaps the more interesting issue raised by Mr. Feigen relates to
the transformations taking place within more regionally-focused
capital markets which may increase their viability as an alternative
venue to the United States for offerings by companies that have re-
ceived private equity.24 Specifically, Mr. Feigen asserts that
"[g]overnments now realize that the flow of investment capital is
correlated with investor friendly changes in laws, regulations, and
standards that will bring comfort, rather than roadblocks, to potential
investors."25 In particular, the ongoing efforts by the European Union
toward the harmonization of capital market standards on that conti-
nent as well as the establishment of monetary union, may ultimately
prove to be one of the most significant developments in fostering the
growth of international private equity investment.
The European Union has undertaken a number of initiatives in re-
cent years to overcome its challenging environment for small and
medium-sized enterprises and, quite expectedly, to better compete
with the United States' job-creating entrepreneurs.26 These initiatives
have included helping to foster the creation of EASDAQ, an ex-
change specifically designed to improve liquidity for small and me-
toward United States investors, and, therefore, the comfort level with such instru-
ments gives them an advantage in the marketplace. Secondly, a United States in-
vestor who purchases securities in a foreign issuer represented by GDRs could do
so only pursuant to the limitations of Regulation S concerning off-shore securities
offerings or pursuant to the safe harbor set out in Rule 144A concerning private
placements. See Searching for Liquidity, supra note 1, at 91-96 (describing Rule
144A and Regulation S).
24. See Feigen, supra note 4, at 114.
25. Id
26. See Communication from the Commission of the European Communities:
Reporting on the Feasibility of the Creation of a European Capital Market for
Smaller Entrepreneurially Managed Companies, COM(95)498 final at 3 (outlining
the various initiatives taken by the European Union and the Commission).
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dium-sized enterprises along the lines of the United States'
NASDAQ, the adoption of the Investment Services Directive, the
Prospectus Directive, and the Capital Adequacy Directive." The
European Union is now focusing on removing other barriers in an ef-
fort to foster the access of small and medium-sized enterprises
("SMEs") to long-term capital, including differences in national
laws and practices concerning taxation, accounting standards, corpo-
rate governance, and restrictions on institutional investors." Simulta-
neous with efforts to remove intra-European Union barriers to a freer
flow of capital to SMEs, the European Union is also currently con-
sidering the establishment of a US$470 million fund for venture
capital support to SMEs.29 As a consequence of these and other de-
velopments, there seems to be some indication that Europe is
emerging as a more vibrant source of private equity."
E. RESHAPING ILLIQUID COMPANIES
Mr. Anderson offers useful insight into the practical perspectives
of the various players involved in an international private equity in-
vestment from its inception to its exit.31 To illustrate the "round-trip"
of the investment through its life cycle,32 he uses a hypothetical of a
Kazakstan state-owned mineral company undergoing privatization.
Assessing this hypothetical, which Mr. Anderson admits is an ex-
treme case, against the above mentioned characteristics of companies
27. See Communication from the Commission of the European Communities:
Reporting on the Obstacles to Financing for SMEs, COM(97)187 final at 1 [here-
inafter Obstacles]; see also Maurice Anslow, Europe's New Bourse Stresses It's
Links with NASDAQ, EUR. VENTuRE CAP. J., May 1995, available in LEXIS, Mkt
Library, Iacnws File.
28. See Obstacles, supra note 27, at 6-12.
29. Emma Tucker, EU Proposes Funding Plan for Companies, FIN. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 1997.
30. See Lee, supra note 8, at 44 (stating "Private equity, venture capital or
merchant banking - whatever you call it - is a hot area that banks and investors are
piling into in Europe, importing US-style aggression and leverage techniques").
Historically, Europe's private equity industry has lagged behind that of the United
States due to its sensitivity to risk, lack of interest in equity, and adversity to new
or complex financial structures. See id
31. Kenneth Anderson, Three Roles for the Private Equity Market in Foreign
Investments: Comments on Mailander's "Searching for Liquidity", 13 AM. U.
INT'LL. REV. 125 (1997).
32. See id. at 129.
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that may be viable candidates for utilizing a United States exit strat-
egy,33 the Kazak company is probably not a viable candidate to util-
ize the structure or strategies outlined in Searching for Liquidity.
Of greater relevance to understanding international private equity
investment, however, is Mr. Anderson's underlying point regarding
the tension between the target company's interest in raising external
financing juxtaposed against the investor's interest in ensuring the
ultimate success of his investment. Particularly in emerging markets,
many foreign companies lack the managerial expertise and culture
conducive to structuring a later-stage exit that will result in a return
on the investment that appropriately compensates the risk assumed.'
This lack of managerial expertise and inability to relinquish a degree
of control over a company is one of the largest pitfalls the Interna-
tional Finance Corporation has encountered in seeking to set up
venture capital funds in developing markets.35 Under more conducive
conditions, the private equity investor should come to play an im-
portant role in advising, managing, and overseeing the company. In
fact, the private equity investor should be vested with the ability to
"influence the company's long-term objectives, strategies, and op-
erations, thereby enhancing the company's attractiveness to other
potential investors and that investor's ability to later liquidate its po-
sition."36 In other words, during the early stages of the investment
relationship, the investor should play a significant role in shaping the
company to ultimately realize a condition of liquidity-a condition
beneficial not only to the self-interested investor, but also to the
company's long-term prospects.37
33. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
34. See Searching for Liquidity, supra note 1, at 77.
35. See INT'L FIN. CORP., supra note 5, at 28.
36. Searching for Liquidity, supra note 1, at 77.
37. Mr. Anderson notes that the use of ADRs in a United States offering does
not foster liquidity in the offering at the time of exit simply by virtue of their use.
See Anderson, supra note 31, at 131. Certainly nothing suggested in Searching for
Liquidity supported such a premise, and his characterization of ADRs as "financial
alchemy" seems overstated. Id On the other hand, while permissible if registered,
a direct offering of foreign shares to United States investors without the use of
ADRs, particularly for an emerging market company, is not likely to receive a
warm reception in the United States. Such an offering would again face the very
condition of illiquidity it is seeking to overcome through its intended capital-
raising offering. See Searching for Liquidity, supra note I, at 83-85.
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III. AT A CROSSROADS: A RENEWED CALL FOR
INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE EQUITY
INVESTMENT
Due in large part to the tremendous economic liberalization that
has taken place globally over the past decade,38 international flows of
capital have increased exponentially. One of the most interesting
trends within this international financial development has been the
increasing dedication of such capital flows to investments in emerg-
ing markets.39 However, as evidenced by the market turmoil caused
by Mexico's currency devaluation in 1994, the resulting "chill" on
investment in Latin America, and the wave of devaluations that have
spread through Asia in 1997, these increased flows of capital have
come under closer scrutiny.
Many emerging economies, long protected from the influence of
foreign investment but now experiencing the adverse impact of vola-
tile markets, 40 are at a crossroads. Do they continue down a path of
liberalization and openness or return to a system closed to foreign in-
vestment and, presumably, less susceptible to volatility?t' This issue
38. See U.N. CONF. ON TRADE AND DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1997:
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, MARKET STRUCTURE, AND COMPETITION
POLICY, at xvii, U.N. Sales No. E.97.I.D.10 (1997) [hereinafter WORLD
INVESTMENT] (noting that from 1991 to 1996, 95 percent of a total 599 changes in
foreign direct investment regulatory regimes have been in the direction of liberali-
zation).
39. See Thomas J. McCool, International Financial Crises-Efforts to Antici-
pate, Avoid, and Resolve Sovereign Crises, Rep. to the Chairman, Committee on
Banking and Fin. Services, GAO/GGD/NSIAD-97-168, GEN. REPORTS, July 7,
1997, available in LEXIS, Market Library, Iacnws File [hereinafter GAO REPORT]
(referring to G-10 statistics reporting that total net capital flows-both public and
private-to developing countries and countries in transition reached a high of
US$218 billion in 1995).
40. See WORLD INVESTMENT, supra note 38, at 114 (citing IFC data showing
that in 1988, only three emerging stock markets were classified as "free" and 11
as "relatively free" with respect to foreign investment in stocks owned locally).
By 1995, the IFC had classified 26 emerging markets as free, 11 as relatively free,
and only one as closed to foreign investment. See id.
41. In the wake of severe volatility, many foreign governments have sought to
pin blame for the situation on foreign investors and, more specifically, on "hot"
money-liquid portfolio investment that can quickly enter and leave a market. See
Steve Glain, Asians Blame Foreigners for Their Woes, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1997,
at A 17; Roberto Salinas-Leon, Market Mania, WORLDPAPER, June 1, 1997, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Wpaper File; Melito S. Salazar, Jr. Opportunities in
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was raised in Searching for Liquidity, 42 but warrants further analysis
given the urgency facing many emerging markets. 3
A. CATEGORIZING FOREIGN CAPITAL
Most economies have subscribed to the view that foreign invest-
ment is essential to their development. But foreign investment has
many forms, the characteristics of which have different implications
for each host economy. As noted above, one commentator separates
foreign investment into two categories: "good" and "bad." 4 He ar-
gues that flows of portfolio investment directed toward financial
markets create volatility in emerging markets and that such capital is
"bad." Conversely, foreign direct investment goes into the real
economy and creates growth for that market and is therefore
"good." 45
While this distinction is analytically useful to understanding the
current economic state of various emerging markets and their sus-
ceptibility to devaluation, it may be overly simplistic for purposes of
assessing how emerging markets may ultimately respond to the in-
fluence of foreign investment in the future. For example, the United
Nation's World Investment Report 1997 attempts to distinguish for-
eign portfolio investment and foreign direct investment in order to
gauge overall flows between developed countries and emerging mar-
the Regional Currency Turmoil, BUS. DAILY, Nov. 5, 1997.
42. See Searching for Liquidity, supra note 1, at 78-80.
43. Some emerging markets have, or at least have attempted to, reinstitute
capital controls to mitigate the influence of external investment in their market.
See Robert S. Greenberger & Helene Cooper, Trade Barriers Signal Caution in
Asian Crisis, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 1997, at A16 (describing new barriers being
imposed in Asia and Latin America); Jonathan Karp & Sumit Sharma, India Alters
Tactic on Rupee, But Market Remains Unimpressed, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 1997, at
A14.
44. See Howell, supra note 2, at 105.
45. See id Howell argues that emerging markets should use as a barometer for
their health a measure of" fundamental balance," which is defined as "the sum of
a country's current account position plus its total net receipts of foreign direct in-
vestment, less any scheduled foreign debt repayments." Id. The fundamental bal-
ance is offered as a measure of the quality of the capital flowing into a country.
Based on this model, economies which have channeled foreign portfolio invest-
ment into consumer spending have proven themselves able to mask underlying
economic instability for a period of time, but eventually these economies experi-
ence currency devaluation. See id (citing Thailand, Mexico, the Philippines and
Pakistan as all exhibiting this characteristic).
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kets.46 The report recognizes that, in principal, foreign private equity
investment does not result in managerial control over a foreign com-
pany, is premised on a relatively short time horizon, and is motivated
primarily by the financial returns which can be gained on the invest-
ment.47 In contrast, foreign direct investment does result in a degree
of control, has a longer timeline, and is motivated with an intent to-
ward facilitating the development of a productive and efficient unit
in a multi-national corporation's overall operations.48 The report also
recognizes that these general principles do not adequately describe
all types of investments. Most prominently, it states that although
international venture capital investment is classified as portfolio in-
vestment, it operates in many respects like foreign direct invest-
ment.49 Therefore, using the parlance set forth above, a form of inter-
national private equity investment, like venture capital, looks like
"bad" capital, but behaves like "good" capital.
The implications of this analysis are important to understanding
the legal and operational impact that various forms of capital controls
could have on foreign investment, including international private eq-
uity investment.5" The concern is that in a rush to impose capital
controls, the result may be to unintentionally stem the flow of other
forms of " good" capital, like private equity and venture capital.
B. MANAGING THE FLOWS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
In their article, Encouraging Relational Investment and Control-
ling Portfolio Investment in Developing Countries in the Aftermath
of the Mexican Financial Crisis, Enrique Carrasco and Randall
Thomas propose that to realize the benefits of foreign investment
while mitigating the adversities of market volatility, emerging mar-
kets should encourage forms of "relational investment" such as
venture capital investing and "restrict foreign capital inflows to
manageable levels and insulate their domestic economies from these
46. See WORLD INVESTMENT, supra note 38, at 107-111.
47. See id at 108-109.
48. See id. at 108-111.
49. See id
50. See GAO REPORT, supra note 39, at 41 (defining capital controls as meas-
ures to "limit the types of flows that come into or out of a country as well as limit
the speed at which funds can enter or exit a country").
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movements." 5 While encouraging investors to take long-term, illiq-
uid interests in emerging market companies ("relational investing")
offers a number of benefits toward economic development, as advo-
cated in Searching for Liquidity and by its commentators, a reasser-
tion of capital controls on foreign investment in emerging markets is
disturbing.
First, the extreme market volatility experienced in recent years in
some emerging markets is not the direct product of increasing flows
of foreign capital. More accurately, it is the poor underlying eco-
nomic fundamentals of the host country that are at the base of such
volatility.52 The massive inflows of foreign capital have had, in some
instances, the effect of masking these economic problems for a pe-
riod of time.53 Additionally, once the economic condition was no
longer sustainable, massive outflows of foreign capital accentuated
the volatility and adversity facing the emerging market during its
wake.' Nonetheless, remedies to avoid further instances of market
volatility rest more appropriately with correcting the macroeconomic
51. Enrique R. Carrasco & Randall Thomas, Encouraging Relational Invest-
ment and Controlling Porfolio Investment in Developing Countries in the After-
math of the Mexican Financial Crisis, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 539, 544-545
(1996). The authors also propose that guidelines be developed to regulate interna-
tional portfolio fund managers' use of power in Latin America and other emerging
markets. See id
52. See Informe Economico: Evaluacio Mensualy Pronosticos de la Economia
Mexicana (Economic Report: Monthly Evaluation and Forecast for the Mexican
Economy), GRuPO FINANCIERO BANCOMER, Sept. 1997, at 8 (describing the eco-
nomic variables that contributed to the devaluations in Asia). Bancomer, with ex-
tensive first-hand experience in the implications of a currency crisis, notes that
four elements aggravated the Asian situation. These include: (1) inconsistent
monetary and foreign exchange policies (e.g., fixed or pegged exchange rates no
longer sustainable under current economic conditions); (2) weaknesses in the fi-
nancial sector, (3) a loss of competitiveness for the economy, as represented by a
high and growing current account deficit; and (4) a pattern of investments that are
speculative or channeled toward low profitability projects (like large government-
financed projects). See id
53. See Howell, supra note 2, at 105 (stating that the problem lies in the stabil-
ity of the emerging financial systems). According to Howell: " When global capital
pours in, its effects are magnified many times. The result is either a consumer
boom and a swelling trade deficit, or a long period of overinvestment that culmi-
nates in severe debt and banking problems. But the outcome is always a currency
crisis." Id
54. See GAO REPORT, supra note 39 (recognizing that "large fund flows into
emerging market countries may amplify the magnitude of financial crises, conta-
gion, and any effect on the international financial system").
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conditions of a country," rather than on flows of foreign capital. 6
Second, while there may be a theoretical attraction to using capital
controls to the flow of foreign investment, the practical evidence in-
dicates otherwise. A comprehensive survey of economic studies on
the effectiveness of capital controls, released by the International
Monetary Fund in December of 1996, concludes that such controls
may be effective in terms of influencing interest rate yield differen-
tials.57 There is, however, no evidence that suggests that they have
enhanced economic welfare within a market. More specific to this
analysis, there was no evidence that capital controls could be used to
change the volume or composition of private capital flows (e.g., en-
couraging FDI and private equity while discouraging foreign portfo-
lio investment)."
Third, foreign portfolio investment and foreign direct investment
are inherently linked-the benefits of one accentuate the prospects
for the other. '9 Of particular significance to this discussion, the typi-
cally shorter-term portfolio investment is often an essential ingredi-
ent in the success of longer-term investments like foreign direct in-
vestment and private equity investment. The International Finance
55. See Martha M. Hamilton, Don't Cry for Latin America, WASH. POST, Mar.
16, 1997, at H2 (noting that foreign direct investment and foreign portfolio in-
vestment has continued to flow to Mexico due, in large part, to the necessary eco-
nomic restructuring and privatizations, which have taken place both before and
after its currency devaluation).
56. See Rates Decline 'Not Justified', FIN. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1997, at 6 (citing re-
cently released report from the Institute of International Finance showing that
spreads on emerging market bonds declined in recent years to a level lower than
justified by the risks of the investments). It should be acknowledged that the mar-
ket's perception that the risks in emerging market economies were lower than
more objective assessments would dictate, may have contributed to the greater size
of inflows and the significant impact of rapid outflows on those markets affected
by currency crises. See Paul Blustein, 'Spread' the Bad Word in Emerging Mar-
kets'Downfall, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1997, at El.
57. See Michael P. Dooley, A Survey of Literature on Controls Over Interna-
tional Capital, INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF PAPERS, Dec. 1996, at 639, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, Asapii File.
58. See id
59. See WORLD INVESTMENT, supra note 38, at 107-11. The United Nations
stresses that foreign portfolio investment plays an essential role in financing do-
mestic companies, increasing the liquidity of local stock exchanges, strengthening
domestic financial infrastructures, and facilitating the operations of the multina-
tional corporations actively involved in providing foreign direct investment. See
id
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Corporation notes that ten years ago most emerging country stock
markets were characterized as having small capitalization, few listed
stocks, low turnover, a weak regulatory and institutional environment
for investors (e.g., accounting, disclosure, investor protection), and
restrictions on foreign entry, capital and dividend repatriation.' The
IFC's experience has shown that the entry of foreign portfolio in-
vestment fostered the development of the local market in two ways.6'
First, foreign portfolio investment increased the regulation, transpar-
ency, and integrity of the local market. Second, foreign portfolio in-
vestment has both broadened and deepened the market by setting into
motion a "virtuous circle of liquidity," which improves conditions
for existing securities and encourages new offerings for companies
previously not exposed to external capital.62 This evolution within
local markets is essential to the ultimate success of the international
private equity investment.63 In the context of establishing capital
controls, driving a wedge between the various types of foreign in-
60. See INT'L FIN. CORP., supra note 5, at 49-52.
61. The IFC also indicates that the primary beneficiaries of improved local
stock markets have been local companies. According to the IFC, 90 percent of the
stock market capitalization in emerging markets is held by local investors as op-
posed to international portfolio equity funds and direct investors. See id at 48.
62. Id at 51.
63. See Carrasco & Thomas, supra note 5 1, at 597 n.329. In their discussion of
the underlying need to restrict foreign portfolio capital flows into emerging mar-
kets, Carrasco and Thomas correctly note that "large and sudden shifts of portfolio
investments can create economic and political upheavals in these countries." Id at
597. They attribute such volatility to two sources: (1) the thinness of the capital
market and (2) inefficiencies in the market. See id Regarding the challenge posed
by the thinness of the capital market, the authors state that the only cure is to ex-
pand its size by increasing the amount of capital in the market. Regarding the
challenges posed by inefficiencies being present in the market, their recommenda-
tion is that improvements be made toward the better dissemination of information
through improved disclosure, enhanced investor protection, and expanded trading
in a broader number of issues. See id Several comments on their observations and
recommendations are warranted. First, in the eyes of the IFC, these two remedies
have been jump-started in local markets by the increased presence of foreign port-
folio investment, the very type of investment the authors recommend restraining.
See INT'L FIN. CORP., supra note 5, at 49-52. Second, given the importance of the
liquidity of the local equities market to the successful exit from an international
private equity investment (a form of "relational investment" the authors advo-
cate), the recommended controls on portfolio investment may have an adverse,
unintended consequence. See id Finally, capital controls typically embed ineffi-
ciencies within a given market and, therefore, are not a constructive means of im-
proving its long-term operation and stability. See Dooley, supra note 57, at 639.
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vestment as a means of encouraging one and discouraging the other
is likely to be counterproductive to the overall economic develop-
ment of a country.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the wake of the volatility experienced in a number of emerging
markets in the past several years, the temptation will be to return to
protectionist measures, which shield an economy from external in-
fluence. Unfortunately, such measures act to preserve market ineffi-
ciencies and structural deficiencies. In terms of foreign investment,
long-term, illiquid investments like foreign direct investment and
international private equity investment can play an essential role in
enhancing the welfare of both developed and emerging markets. Ef-
forts to foster these forms of financing should be encouraged. The
path of such encouragement should not be marked by new barriers to
foreign investment, regardless of their form. Rather, the path of eco-
nomic development should be marked by continued efforts to remove
remaining legal barriers, strengthen local financial systems and mar-
ket structures, and implement sound macroeconomic policies.
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